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Abstract
When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as
combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics
can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure
truthfulness).
We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mech-
anisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where only the valuation is unknown by
the mechanism (the single parameter case). For this case we extend the work of Lehmann
O’Callaghan, and Shoham, who presented greedy heuristics, and show how to use IF-THEN-
ELSE constructs, perform a partial search, and use the LP relaxation. We apply these tech-
niques for several types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable
approximation ratios.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in combinatorial auctions, in which a number of non-
identical items are sold concurrently and bidders express preferences about combinations of items
and not just about single items. Such combinatorial auctions have been suggested for a host of auc-
tion situations such as those for spectrum licenses, pollution permits, landing slots, computational
resources, online procurement and others. See [25] for a recent survey.
Beyond their direct applications, combinatorial auctions are emerging as the central representa-
tive problem for a whole new field of research that is sometimes called algorithmic mechanism design.
This field deals with the interplay of algorithmic considerations and game-theoretic considerations
that stem from computing systems that involve participants (players, agents) with differing goals.
Many leading examples are motivated by Internet applications, e.g., various networking protocols,
electronic commerce, and non-cooperative software agents. See e.g. [27] for an early treatment,
and [20, 26] for more recent surveys. The combinatorial auction problem is attaining this central
status due to two elements: First, the problem is very expressive (e.g. a competition for network
resources needed for routing can be modeled as a combinatorial auction of bandwidth on the various
communication links). Second, dealing with combinatorial auctions requires treating a very wide
spectrum of issues.
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Indeed implementation of combinatorial auctions faces many challenges ranging from purely
representational questions of succinctly specifying the various bids, to purely algorithmic challenges
of efficiently solving the resulting, NP-hard, allocation problems, to pure game-theoretic questions
of bidders’ strategies and equilibria. Much work has recently been done on these topics, see e.g.,
[15, 18, 21, 24, 6, 10] and many references therein.
Perhaps the most interesting questions are those that intimately combine computational con-
siderations and game theoretic ones. Possibly the most central problem of this form is the difficulty
of getting algorithmically efficient truthful mechanisms. The basic game-theoretic requirement
in mechanism design is that of “truthfulness” (incentive compatibility), i.e. that the participat-
ing agents are motivated to cooperate with the protocol 1. The basic algorithmic requirement is
computational efficiency. Each of these requirements can be addressed separately: “VCG mecha-
nisms” [30, 9, 12] – the basic possibility result of mechanism design – ensure truthfulness, and a host
of algorithmic techniques (e.g. [28, 31, 32]) can achieve reasonably good allocations for most practi-
cal purposes (despite the general NP-hardness of the allocation problem). Unfortunately, these two
requirements do conflict with each other. It has been noticed [18, 23] that when VCG mechanisms
are applied to non-optimal allocation algorithms (as any computationally efficient algorithm must
be), truthfulness is not obtained. This problem was studied further in [22, 15, 16].
The fundamental key positive result is due to [18]. They restrict the set of preferences that
agents may have to be what they call “single minded”, i.e. agents that are only interested in a single
bundle of items. For this class of bidders they present a family of simple greedy mechanisms that
are both algorithmically efficient and truthful. They also show that one mechanism in this family
has provable approximation properties. In this paper we continue this line of research. We slightly
further restrict the agents, but we obtain a much richer class of algorithmically efficient truthful
mechanisms. In fact we present a set of general tools that allow the creation of such mechanisms.
Many of our results, but not all of them, apply also to the general class of single-minded bidders.
In our model, termed “known single minded bidders”, we not only assume that each agent
is only interested in a single bundle of goods, but also that the identity of this bundle can be
verified by the mechanism (in fact it suffices that the cardinality of the bundle can be verified).
This assumption is reasonable in a wide variety of situations where the required set of goods can
be inferred from context, e.g. messages that needs to be routed over a set of network links, or
bundles of a given cardinality. Our model captures the general case where only a single parameter
(a one-dimensional valuation) is unknown to the mechanism and must be handled in a truthful
way. (The single parameter case has also been studied from a computational point of view in a
different context in [2].) We first present an array of general algorithmic techniques that can be
used to obtain truthful algorithms:
• Generalizations of the greedy family of algorithms suggested by [18].
• A technique based on linear programming.
• Finitely bounded exhaustive search.
• A “MAX” construct: this construction combines different truthful algorithms and takes the
best solution.
1We defer the exact game theoretic definitions to section 2. In general one only needs equilibria, but the revelation
principle allows concentration on truthful mechanisms.
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• An If-Then-Else construct: this construction allows branching, according to a condition, to
one of many truthful algorithms.
The combination of these techniques provides enough flexibility to allow construction of many
types of truthful algorithms. In particular it allows many types of partial search algorithms –
the basic heuristic approach in many applications. We demonstrate the generality and power of
our techniques by constructing polynomial-time truthful algorithms for several important cases of
combinatorial auctions for which we prove approximation guarantees:
• An √m-approximation for the general case for any fixed  > 0. This improves over the √m
ratio proved in [18], where m is number of items. This is, in fact, the best algorithm (due
to [13]) known for combinatorial auctions even without requiring truthfulness.
• A very simple 2-approximation for the homogeneous (multi-unit) case. Despite the exten-
sive literature on multi unit auctions (starting with the seminal paper [30]) this is the first
polynomial time truthful mechanism with valuations that are not downward sloping.
• An m + 1-approximation for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with m types of goods.
Recent Related Results. Since the initial publication of this paper several papers have consid-
ered the model of known-single-minded bidders. An (1 + )-approximation truthful mechanism is
presented in [1] for combinatorial auctions with lnm copies of each item. Auctioning Convex Bun-
dles (e.g. advertising space on newspaper’s page) for both single-minded-bidders and known-single-
minded-bidders is studied in [3], demonstrating truthful mechanisms with better approximation
ratios for the known-single-minded-bidders model.
Recent papers [7, 5, 4] consider mechanisms for multi-minded-bidders, in which every bidder is
interested in exactly one subset from a collection of subsets, and all such subsets have exactly the
same value for the bidder (the “single-value-case”). In [5] a deterministic technique suggested to
convert several truthful mechanisms for known-single-minded bidders to mechanisms in undomi-
nated strategies for single-minded bidders.
Several approximation mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with general bidders (not “nec-
essarily single minded”) and various notions of implementations were recently considered in [4,
17, 11]. However, a deterministic
√
m-approximation dominant-strategy computationally-efficient
Combinatorial Auction mechanism for the general setting is still not known.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we formally present our model and
notations. In section 3 we also provide a simple algorithmic characterization of truthful mechanisms.
In section 4 we present our basic techniques and prove their correctness, and in section 5 we present
our operators for combining truthful mechanisms. In section 6 we present our applications and
prove their approximation properties. Finally, in section 7, we shortly mention which of our results
generalize to the single-minded case and then present our mechanisms for this more general case.
2 The Model
We formally present our model: the mechanism under consideration, its basic components and the
assumptions on the bidders’ type.
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2.1 Combinatorial Auctions
We consider an auction of a set U of m distinct items to a set N of n bidders. We assume that
bidders value combinations of items: i.e., items may be complements or substitutes of each other.
Formally, each bidder j has a valuation function vj() that describes his valuation for each subset
S ⊆ U of items, i.e. vj(S) ≥ 0 is the maximal amount of money j ∈ N is willing to pay for S.
An allocation S1, ..., Sn is a partition of the items U among the bidders. We consider here
auctions that aim to maximize the total social welfare, w =
∑
j vj(Sj), of the allocation. The
auction rules describe a payment pj for each bidder j. We assume the bidders have quasi linear
utilities, so bidder j’s overall utility for winning the set Sj and paying pj is uj = vj(Sj)− pj .
2.2 Known Single Minded Bidders
In this paper we only discuss a limited class of bidders, single minded bidders, that were introduced
by [18].
Definition 1 [18] Bidder j is single minded if there is a set of goods Sj ⊆ U and a value v∗j ≥ 0
such that vj(S) =
{
v∗j S ⊇ Sj
0 otherwise.
I.e., the bidder is willing to pay v∗j as long as he is allocated Sj. We assume that each v
∗
j is
privately known to bidder j. We deviate from [18] and assume that the subsets Sj’s are known to
the mechanism (or alternatively can be independently deduced or authenticated by the mechanism).
We call this case, known single minded bidders. It is easy to verify that all our results apply even
if only the cardinality of Sj is known. Some of our results hold even if the Sj ’s are only privately
known (as in [18]). We shortly describe this case in the last section.
2.3 The Mechanism
We consider only closed bid auctions where each bidder j ∈ N sends his bid vj to the mechanism,
and then the mechanism computes an allocation and determines the payments for each bidder. The
allocation and payments depend on the bidders’ declarations v = (v1, . . . , vn). Thus the auction
mechanism is composed of an allocation algorithm A(v), and a payment rule p(v).
Treated as an algorithm, the allocation algorithm A is given as input not only the bids v1...vn,
but also the sets S1...Sn that are desired by the bidders. Its output specifies a subset A(v) ⊆ N of
winning bids that are pair-wise disjoint, Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for each i 	= j ∈ A(v). Thus bidder j wins the
set Sj if j ∈ A(v) and wins nothing otherwise.
Let v−j be the partial declaration vector (v1, ..., vj−1, vj+1, ..., vn), and let v = (vj , v−j). For
given valuations v−j and allocation algorithm A, we say that vj is a winning declaration if j ∈
A(vj , v−j). Otherwise we say that vj is a losing declaration. Sometimes we shall simply say that
j wins Sj if j ∈ A(v).
The (revealed) social welfare obtained by the algorithm is thus wA(v) = Σj∈A(v)vj. While our
allocation algorithms attempt maximizing this social welfare, they of course can not find optimal al-
locations since that it is NP-hard (“weighted set packing”) and we are interested in computationally
efficient allocation algorithms.
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2.4 Bidders’ strategies
Bidder’s j utility in a mechanism (A, p) is thus uj(v) = vj − pj if j ∈ A(v), and uj(v) = −pj
otherwise. A mechanism is normalized if non-winners pay zero, i.e. pj = 0 for all j 	∈ A(v). In this
case uj = 0 for all j 	∈ A(v).
Bidder j may strategically prefers to declare a value vj 	= v∗j in order to increase his utility. We
are interested in truthful mechanisms where this does not happen.
Definition 2 A mechanism is called truthful (equivalently, incentive compatible) if truthfully declar-
ing vj = v∗j is a dominant strategy for each bidder. I.e. for any declarations of the other bidders
v−j, and any declaration vj of bidder j, uj(v∗j , v−j) ≥ uj(vj , v−j).
2.5 Multi unit Auctions
In a Multi Unit Combinatorial Auction we have many types of items and many identical items of
each type. We consider a multiset U with m different types of items, where mi is the number of
identical items of type i = 1, . . . ,m. Let M be the total number of goods, that is M = Σmi=1mi = |U |.
The special case m = 1 where all items are identical, is called a Multi Unit Auction. The
knapsack problem is a special case of the allocation problem of Multi Unit Auction.
All our results apply also to multi-unit combinatorial auctions, and so we assume that a bidder
is interested in a fixed number of goods of each type. I.e. instead of having a single set Sj, each
bidder has a tuple q1...qm, specifying that he desires (has value vj) a multiset of items that contains
at least qi items of type i, for all i.
3 Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms
It is well known that truthful mechanisms are strongly related to certain monotonicity conditions
on the allocation algorithm. This was formalized axiomatically in the context of combinatorial
auctions with single minded bidders in [18]. We present here a simple characterization for the case
of known single minded bidders. This characterization reduces the problem of designing truthful
mechanisms to that of designing monotone algorithms, which is then considered throughout the
rest of the paper.
3.1 Monotone Allocation Algorithms
An allocation algorithm is monotone if, whenever Sj is allocated and the declared valuation of j
increases, then Sj remains allocated to j. Formally:
Definition 3 An allocation algorithm A is monotone if, for any bidder j and any v−j, if vj is a
winning declaration then any higher declaration v′j ≥ vj also wins.
Lemma 1 Let A be a monotone allocation algorithm. Then, for any v−j there exists a single
critical value θj(A, v−j) ∈ (R+ ∪∞) such that ∀vj > θj(A, v−j), vj is a winning declaration, and
∀vj < θj(A, v−j), vj is a losing declaration.
Proof: Non-existence of critical value for v−j means that for any c ∈ [0,∞] there are distinct v′′j
and v′j such that v
′′
j ≤ c ≤ v′j , where v′′j , v′j are winning and losing declarations, respectively. This
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contradicts A’s monotonicity. If θ1 	= θ2 are distinct critical values, then θ1+θ22 is simultaneously
winning and losing declaration for j, a contradiction.
Fix an algorithm A and bids of the other bidders, v−j . Note that θj = θj(A, v−j) is the infimum
value that j should declare in order to win Sj . In particular, note that θj is independent of vj .
Consider an auction of a single item. It is easy to see that the winner’s critical value is the value
of the 2nd highest bid. Note that the 2nd price (Vickerey) auction fixes this value as the payment
scheme. This can be generalized.
Definition 4 The payment scheme pA associated with the monotone allocation algorithm A that
is based on the critical value is defined by: pj = θj(A, v−j) if j wins Sj , and pj = 0 otherwise.
3.2 The Characterization
It turns out that monotone allocation algorithms with critical value payment schemes capture
essentially all truthful mechanisms. Formally they capture exactly truthful normalized mechanisms,
(those where losers pay zero), but any truthful mechanism can be easily converted to be normalized
(by adjusting the payment scheme in the following way: p′j = pj(S)− pj(∅)).
Theorem 1 A normalized mechanism is truthful if and only if its allocation algorithm is monotone
and its payment scheme is based on critical value.
The theorem is a consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let (A, p) be a truthful normalized mechanism. Then A is monotone and p is based on
critical value.
Proof: Here pj should be no more than the declared value vj (otherwise the bidder would prefer
to gain zero utility by simply declaring untruthfully zero2). Fix v−j , and consider the values
vj < v
′
j . Assume by contradiction that vj, v
′
j winning
3 and losing declarations, respectively, and
that v′j = v∗j . In this case j would prefer to declare untruthfully vj in order to gain positive utility.
The monotonicity follows.
Consider the following scenario: Bidder j truthfully declares vj, wins Sj and pays pj > θj.
However, θj +  is a winning declaration with a lower payment and hence a higher utility. Therefore
pj ≤ θj . For the case pj < θj, consider j with true value v∗j , where pj < v∗j < θj. Bidding truthfully
results in zero utility. Bidding untruthfully θj + , the bidder wins Sj , pays pj and gains positive
utility. Hence the payment for Sj is exactly pj = θj.
Lemma 3 Let A be a monotone allocation algorithm and pA the associated critical value payment
scheme.Then the mechanism (A, pA) is truthful.
Proof: Fix v−j . Let S′, S be the sets bidder j wins, and u′j, uj the utilities j gains when bidding v′j ,
v∗j , respectively. We argue that u′j ≤ uj in each of the following cases, as a result truthful bidding
is a dominant strategy.
2assuming a value of zero never wins.
3assuming sovereignty, that is there is a winning declaration for each bundle and player.
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1. S′ = S. The payment is independent of j’s declaration, hence the utilities are equal.
2. S′ = ∅, S = Sj. Clearly v′j < θj ≤ v∗j . Then, u′j(∅) = 0 ≤ v∗j − θj = vj(Sj)− pj(Sj) = uj(Sj).
3. S′ = Sj, S = ∅. Clearly v′j ≥ θj > v∗j . Then, u′j(Sj) = v∗j − θj = vj(Sj)− pj(Sj) ≤ 0 = uj(∅).
The theorem also implies that if the allocation is polynomially computable, then so is the
payment scheme (using binary search).
Proposition 1 If the allocation algorithm of a truthful normalized mechanism is computable in
polynomial time, then so is the payment scheme.
Proof: Assume that the input v1, . . . , vn is a tuple of integer numbers (so that the domain of players’
true values is integral). In this case, performing a binary search to find the critical value takes
polynomial time. In case the critical value is not necessarily an integer4 we use the following simple
observation. As the critical value is unique we can round up the critical value to the consecutive
integer. This value is well defined and maintains truthfulness for integral input. Again, performing
binary search to find the rounded up critical value is polynomial.
Note that this observation is applicable for every valuation domain with finite binary represen-
tation that has the following property: if vi ≤ v′i then binary(vi) ≤ binary(v′i).
3.3 Bitonic Allocation Algorithms
We use a special case of monotone allocation algorithms, called bitonic. Given a monotone algorithm
A, the property of bitonicity involves the connection between vj and the social welfare of the
allocation A(vj , v−j). What it requires is that the welfare does not increase with vj when vj loses,
vj < θj, and does increase with vj when vj wins, vj > θj . (see fig. 1).
Definition 5 A monotone allocation algorithm A is bitonic if for every bidder j and any v−j, one
of the welfare wA(v−j, vj) is a non-increasing function of vj for vj < θj and a non-decreasing
function of vj for vj ≥ θj.
One would indeed expect that a given bid does not affect the allocation between the other bids,
and thus for vj < θj we would expect wA to be constant, and for vj > θj we would expect wA to
grow linearly with vj . Most of our examples, as well as the optimal allocation algorithm, indeed
follow this pattern. This need not hold in general though and there do exist non-bitonic monotone
algorithms.
Example 1 A non-bitonic monotone allocation algorithm
XOR-algorithm(Y, i, j, k)
Input: Y ∈ R+ and i, j, k ∈ N .
If the valuation vi of bidder i is below Y then bidder j wins. Else if vi is below 2Y then bidder k wins.
Else bidder i wins.
4E.g. if we re-index the bids by
vj√
|Sj |
≥ vj+1√|Sj+1| and greedily allocate.
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Figure 1: A curve of a bitonic allocation algorithm.
The XOR-algorithm is monotone (the critical value for any bidder other than i is either zero or
infinity, and the critical value for bidder i is 2Y ). Focusing on bidder i, observe that the welfare in
the interval [0, 2Y ) may be increasing, and so the XOR-algorithm is not bitonic in general.
4 Some Basic Truthful Mechanisms
In this section we present several monotone allocation algorithms. Each of them may be used as a
basis for a truthful mechanism. They can also be combined between themselves using the operators
described later on.
4.1 Greedy
The main algorithmic result of [18] was the identification of the following scheme of greedy algo-
rithms as truthful. First the bids are reordered according to a certain “monotone” ranking criteria.
Then, considering the bids in the new order, bids are allocated greedily. We start with a slight
generalization of their result.
Definition 6 A ranking r is a collection of n real valued functions (r1(), r2(), . . . , rn()), where
rj() = rj(vj , Sj), j ∈ N . A ranking r is monotone if each rj() is non-decreasing in vj .
We will use the following monotone rankings.
1. The value ranking: rj(.) = vj , j = 1 . . . n.
2. The density ranking: rj(.) =
vj
|Sj | , j = 1 . . . n.
3. The compact ranking by k: rj(.) =
{
vj |Sj | ≤
√
M
k
0 otherwise
where k > 0 is fixed, j = 1 . . . n.
We now describe the greedy algorithm, that greedily allocate the bids with the highest rank.
Greedy Algorithm Gr based on ranking r
1. Reorder the bids by decreasing value of rj(.).
2. WinningBids ← ∅, NonAllocItems ← U .
3. For j = 1..n (in the new order) if (Sj ⊆ NonAllocItems)
• WinningBids ← WinningBids ∪ {j}.
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• NonAllocItems ← NonAllocItems− Sj.
4. Return WinningBids.
Lemma 4 (essentially due to [18]) Any greedy allocation scheme Gr that is based on a monotone
ranking r is monotone.
Proof: For any v−j and vj ≤ v′j , the monotonicity of r implies rj(vj) ≤ rj(v′j). If vj is a winning
declaration for j, then when Gr considers satisfying Sj , say in the k’th iteration, no conflict oc-
curs, that is Sj ⊆ NonAllocItems. Moreover, considering Sj in any former iteration would imply
no such conflict, since NonAllocItems in any former iteration is a superset of NonAllocItems in
the beginning of the k’th iteration. The ranking values of all other bids are identical for the two
possible inputs. Hence declaring v′j ensures considering Sj in an iteration ≤ k. It follows that v′j is
a winning declaration.
It turns out that a greedy algorithm is in fact bitonic.
Lemma 5 Any greedy allocation scheme Gr that is based on a monotone ranking r is bitonic.
Proof: Consider any v−j. By Lemma 4 Gr is monotone with the critical value θ = θj(Gr, v−j). Let
f(y) = wGr(v−j , y), that is f(y) is the welfare of the allocation Gr(v−j , y). Assume w.l.o.g that
declaring θ by bidder j is a winning declaration. ∀y < θ : f(y) = f(0), since declaring y or zero by
bidder j results in the same allocation (without Sj). Hence f() is a constant function on [0, θ). In
addition, ∀y ≥ θ declaring y or θ result in the same allocation with Sj, and so f(y) = f(θ)+ y− θ.
We conclude that f() is a linear increasing function on [θ,∞).
4.2 Partial Exhaustive Search
The second algorithm we present, performs an exhaustive search over all combinations of at most
k bids. The running time is polynomial for every fixed k.
Exst-k Search Algorithm
1. WinningBids ← ∅, Max ← 0.
2. For each (subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |J | ≤ k):
if (∀i, j ∈ J, i 	= j : Si ∩ Sj = ∅) then
• if (ΣJ vi > Max) then
Max ← ΣJ vi and WinningBids ← J .
3. Return WinningBids.
The extreme cases are of interest: Exst-1 simply returns the bid with the highest valuation;
and Exst-n is the naive optimal algorithm which searches the entire solution space. We shall use
Exst-1, and hence give it an additional name.
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Largest Algorithm
Return the bid with the highest valuation vh = maxj∈Nvj .
Lemma 6 For every k, Exst-k is monotone and bitonic.
Proof: Consider any v−j and values vj < v′j , where we assume by contradictory that vj, v′j are
winning and losing declarations, respectively. Let WinningBids, WinningBids’ be the respective
allocations and Max, Max’ be the respective welfares. Algorithm Exst-k considers WinningBids and
WinningBids’ for both possible declarations. It must be the case that Max′ ≥ Max−vj +v′j > Max.
A contradiction, since Exst-k on the input (v−j, vj) should outputWinningBids’ instead ofWinning-
Bids. The monotonicity of Exst-k follows. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of lemma 5.
4.3 LP based
Since the combinatorial auction problem is an integer programming problem, many authors have
tried heuristics that follow the standard approach of using the linear programming relaxation [21,
32, 31]. In general such heuristics are not truthful (i.e., not monotone). In this section we present
a very simple heuristic based on the LP relaxation that is truthful.
In this subsection we use general notation of multi unit combinatorial auctions. The multiset Sj
can be regarded as the m-tuple (q1j, . . . , qmj), where qij it the number of items of type i in Sj. The
optimal allocation problem can be formulated as the following integer program, denoted IP (v).
maximize Σnj=1zjvj
subject to:
Σnj=1zj qij ≤ mi i = 1, . . . ,m
zj ∈ {0, 1} j = 1, . . . , n
Removing the integrality constraint we get the following linear program relaxation, denoted
LP (v):
maximize Σnj=1xjvj
subject to:
Σnj=1xj qij ≤ mi i = 1, . . . ,m
xj ∈ [0, 1] j = 1, . . . , n
Natural heuristics for solving the integer program would attempt using the values of xj in order
to decide on the integral allocation. We show that the following simple rule does indeed provide a
monotone allocation rule.
LP-Based Algorithm
1. Compute an optimal basic solution x for LP (v).
2. Satisfy all bids j for which xj = 1.
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Theorem 2 Algorithm LP-Based is monotone.
Observe that for the case of combinatorial auction (where mi = 1, i = 1..m), as opposed to the
general case of multi unit combinatorial auction, we could have taken the threshold of 1/2, that is
to satisfy all bids with xj > 12 .
Notations: Let vj ≤ v′j and so Δ = v′j − vj is nonnegative. Let x, x′ be optimal feasible solu-
tions to LP (v), LP (v′), respectively, where v′ = (v−j, v′j). The proof of theorem 2 is a consequence
of the following lemma.
Lemma 7 ∀v−j, xj is a non-decreasing function of vj.
Proof: x′ is feasible solution to LP (v) and so Σnl=1 x
′
lvl ≤ Σnl=1 xlvl. Similarly, x is feasible to
LP (v′) and so xjΔ + Σnl=1 xlvl ≤ x′jΔ + Σnl=1 x′lvl. Then, 0 ≤ Σnl=1 (xl − x′l)vl ≤ (x′j − xj)Δ.
Thus xj ≤ x′j .
Proof (of theorem): vj is a winning declaration for bidder j iff xj = 1. Using lemma 7 we get that
1 = xj ≤ x′j ≤ 1, and hence v′j ≥ vj is a winning declaration as well.
We will also later require the following property of the LP solution.
Lemma 8 Let σ = Σnl=1xlvl be the optimal objective function value of LP (v), and similarly σ
′ =
x′jΔ + Σ
n
l=1x
′
lvl. Then for any v−j , and vj ≤ v′j, σ ≤ σ′ ≤ σ + Δ.
Proof: The optimal solution vector x to LP (v) is a feasible solution to LP (v′), as both have the
same set of constraints. Thus we have σ ≤ σ′. Similarly, x′ is a feasible solution vector to LP (v),
and hence Σnl=1 x
′
lvl ≤ Σnl=1 xlvl. Finally, σ′ = Σnl=1 x′lvl + x′jΔ ≤ Σnl=1 xlvl + x′jΔ ≤ σ + Δ.
5 Combining Truthful Mechanisms
In this section we present two techniques for combining monotone allocation algorithms as to
obtain an improved monotone allocation algorithm. These combination operators together with the
previously presented algorithms provide a general algorithmic toolbox for constructing monotone
allocation algorithms and thus also truthful mechanisms. This toolbox will be used on section 6
in order to construct truthful approximation mechanisms for various special cases of combinatorial
auctions.
5.1 The MAX Operator
Perhaps the most natural way to combine two allocations algorithms is to try both and pick the
best one – the one providing the maximal social welfare.
MAX (A1, A2) Operator
1. Run the algorithms A1 and A2.
2. if wA1(v) ≥ wA2(v) return A1(v), else return A2(v).
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Unfortunately this algorithm is not in general guaranteed to be monotone. For example the
maximum of two XOR-algorithms, (see example 1) with parameters Y, i, j, k and Y ′, i, j′, k′, is not
monotone in general for bidder i. We are able to identify a condition that ensures monotonicity.
Theorem 3 Let A1 and A2 be two monotone bitonic allocation algorithms. Then, M = MAX(A1, A2)
is a monotone bitonic allocation algorithm.
Proof: Fix v−j, and set θ′ = θj(A1, v−j) and θ′′ = θj(A2, v−j). Let f1(y) = wA1(v−j , y), f2(v) =
wA2(v−j , y) and fm(v) = wM (v−j , y) be the respective welfares as a function of the declaration y
of bidder j.
Recall the simple fact: if f(y) and g(y) are decreasing functions then so is h(y) = max{f(y), g(y)}.
Assuming w.l.o.g that θ′ ≤ θ′′, we conclude that ∀y < θ′ the function fm(y) is decreasing, and
∀y > θ′′ the function fm(y) is increasing. For the interval I = [θ′, θ′′] consider the cases:
• θ′ = θ′′. Here f1 and f2 share the same global minimum. Clearly M is a bitonic allocation
algorithm, and θj(M,v−j) = θ′ = θ′′.
• θ′ < θ′′ and ∀y ∈ I : f1(y) ≥ f2(y). Here fm() ≡ f1(). Then M is bitonic as algorithm A1,
and θj(M,v−j) = θ′.
• θ′ < θ′′ and ∀y ∈ I : f1(y) < f2(y). Here fm() ≡ f2(). Then M is bitonic as A2, and
θj(M,v−j) = θ′′.
• Otherwise, it must be the case that f1(θ′) < f2(θ′) and f2(θ′′) ≤ f1(θ′′). Let J be the maximal
interval {y |y ∈ I, f1(y) < f2(y)} and let θ0 = supJ . J is not empty, and θ′ ≤ θ0 ≤ θ′′.
We argue that ∀y ∈ [θ′, θ0) : f2(y) ≥ f1(y) and fm() = f2() is decreasing. Similarly,
∀y ∈ (θ0, θ′′] : f1(y) ≥ f2(y) and fm() = f1() is increasing. Thus M is bitonic, and
θj(M,v−j) = θ0.
Since the maximum of two bitonic algorithms is also bitonic, then inductively the maximum of
any number of bitonic algorithms is monotone.
5.2 The If-Then-Else Operator
The max operator had to run both algorithms. In many cases we wish to have conditional execution
and only run one of the given algorithms, where the choice depends on some condition. This is the
usual If-The-Else construct of programming languages.
If cond() Then A1 Else A2 Operator
If cond(v) holds
return the allocation A1(v).
Else
return the allocation A2(v).
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The monotonicity of the two algorithms does not by itself guarantee that the combination is
monotone. As a simple example consider the following algorithm: If Σni=1vi is even then the bid
with largest valuation wins, otherwise bidder 1 wins. For a fixed v−j , observe that if vj is a winning
declaration (j wins) then vj +1 is a losing declaration (1 wins instead), and so the algorithm is not
monotone for bidder j. We require a certain “alignment” between the condition and the algorithms
in order to ensure monotonicity of the result.
Definition 7 The boolean function cond() is aligned with the allocation algorithm A if for any v−j
and any two values vj ≤ v′j the following hold:
1. If cond(v−j , vj) holds and vj ≥ θj(A, v−j) then cond(v−j , v′j) holds.
2. If cond(v−j , v′j) holds and v′j ≤ θj(A, v−j) then cond(v−j , vj) holds.
Theorem 4 If A1 and A2 are monotone allocation algorithms and cond() is aligned with A1 then
the operator If-Then-Else (cond,A1, A2) is monotone.
Proof: For any v−j and v′j ≥ vj , consider the cases:
• cond(v) holds and j ∈ A1(v). Here cond(v′) holds, where v′ = (v−j , v′j). But then the output
of If-Then-Else(cond,A1, A2, v′) would be A1(v′). Algorithm A1 is monotone, and hence if vj
is a winning declaration for A1(v) then so is v′j .
• cond(v) fails, j ∈ A2(v) and cond(v′) fails. Here the output of If-Then-Else(cond,A1, A2, v′)
is A2(v′). The monotonicity of A2 implies that if vj is a winning declaration then so is v′j.
• cond(v) fails, j ∈ A2(v) and cond(v′) holds. Assume by contradiction, that j /∈ A1(v′). But
then cond(v) must hold (as the 2nd requirement in def. 7).
6 Applications: Approximation Mechanisms
In this section we use the toolbox previously developed to construct truthful approximation mecha-
nisms for several interesting cases of combinatorial auctions (all with known single minded bidders).
These mechanisms all run in polynomial time and obtain allocations that are within a provable gap
from the optimum.
6.1 Multi Unit Auctions
In multi-unit auctions we have a certain number of identical items, and each known single-minded
bidder is willing to offer the price vj for the quantity qj. In fact we are required to solve the NP-
complete knapsack problem. Indeed, despite the vast economic literature, starting with Vickrey’s
seminal paper [30], that deals with multi-unit auctions, this case was never studied, and attention
was always restricted to ”downward sloping bids” that can always be partially fulfilled. While the
knapsack problem has fully polynomial approximation schemes, these are not monotone and thus
do not yield truthful mechanisms. We provide a truthful 2-approximation mechanism.
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Let Gv be the algorithm Greedy based on a value ranking. Let Gd be the algorithm Greedy
based on a density ranking.
Apx-MUA Algorithm
Return the allocation determined by MAX(Gv , Gd).
Theorem 5 The mechanism with Apx-MUA as the allocation algorithm and the associated critical
value payment scheme is 2-approximation truthful mechanism for multi unit auctions.
The proof of theorem is a consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9 Algorithm Apx-MUA is monotone.
Proof: The proof is immediate from Theorem 3 as Gv and Gd are bitonic. By lemma 5, Gv and
Gd are bitonic as both, the value ranking and the density ranking, are monotone. By Theorem 3,
Apx-MUA is monotone as the maximum operator of two bitonic algorithms.
Lemma 10 Apx-MUA is a 2-approximation for the Multi Unit Auction allocation problem.
The following proof is similar to that in [19], it is presented here only for the sake of complete-
ness. Proof: Let vo be the allocation value achieved by any optimal algorithm. It is enough to
show that v
o
2 ≤ max{vGv , vGd}, where the last is the allocation value of Apx-MUA. Assume w.l.o.g
that the bids are indexed so that v1|S1| ≥ · · · ≥ vn|Sn| . Let k be the index such that
∑k−1
j=1 |Sj | ≤ M ,
and
∑k
j=1 |Sj| > M , where M is the total number of identical items. In case no such k exists
all bids are allocated by Apx-MUA. The following upper bound holds vo ≤ ∑kj=1 vj. And so
vo ≤ ∑k−1j=1 vj + maxi∈N vi ≤ vGd + vGv ≤ 2 · max{vGd , vGv}.
6.2 General Combinatorial Auctions
The general combinatorial auction allocation problem is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor
of m
1
2
− (for any fixed  > 0) [14, 29, 18]. A
√
m-approximation truthful mechanism is given in [18]
for the case of single minded bidders. We narrow the gap between the upper bound and lower bound
even further and present truthful mechanisms with performance guarantee of 
√
m, for every fixed
 > 0.
Let Gk be the Greedy algorithm Greedy based on the compact ranking by k.
k-Apx-CA Algorithm
Return the allocation determined by MAX(Exst-k, Gk).
Theorem 6 The mechanism with  42 - Apx-CA as the allocation algorithm and the associated
critical value payment scheme is an (
√
m)-approximation truthful mechanism.
The proof of theorem is a consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 11 Algorithm k-Apx-CA is monotone.
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Proof: Immediate from Theorem 3 as Gk and Exst-k are bitonic.
Lemma 12 Choosing k =  42 , algorithm k-Apx-CA provides 
√
m-approximation for the combi-
natorial auction allocation problem.
The proof is a slight variant for [13], and is presented here for the sake of completeness.
Proof: Define j’s bid as large if |Sj| >
√
m
k , otherwise it is small. Recall that large bids have zero
ranking. We shall consider the following slightly weaker algorithm:
Algorithm 1 k-Apx-CA’
1. Run Exst-k.
2. Construct the input v′′ by ignoring all large bids, and run Gk on v′′.
3. Return the allocation with higher value among them.
Clearly, vGk(v
′′) ≤ vGk(v), since Gk(v′′) and possibly other zero ranked bids are contained in Gk(v).
Denote vo the optimal value, and let Ek be Exst-k. Then,
vo ≤
√
m/k vGk(v
′′) +
m
k
√
m/k
vEk(v)
≤ 2
√
m/k max{vGk(v′′), vEk(v)}
≤ 2
√
m/k max{vGk(v), vEk(v)}
For the first inequality consider the small and the large satisfied bids in the optimal solution. For
each small Sj that Gk satisfies, the optimal algorithm could choose instead at most
√
m
k small bids
each in a conflict with Sj and each of a value at most vj. In addition, in the worst case the optimal
algorithm would choose at most m/
√
m
k large bids, where the total value of each k of them is at
most the value vEk(v), which is the optimal possible value of at most k non-conflicting bids. The
other inequalities are straight forward. Finally for a given  the parameter k should be  42 .
6.3 Multi unit Combinatorial Auctions
Here we consider the general case of multi-unit combinatorial auctions. We provide a monotone
allocation algorithm that provides good approximations in the case that the number of types of
goods, m, is small.
(m + 1)-Apx-MUCA Algorithm
1. Compute an optimal basic solution x to LP (v).
2. Let vh = maxjvj.
3. If Σnl=1xlvl < (m + 1)vh Then return Largest(v); Else return LP-Based(v).
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Theorem 7 The mechanism with (m + 1)-Apx-MUCA as the allocation algorithm and the asso-
ciated critical value payment scheme is (m + 1)-approximation truthful mechanism for multi unit
combinatorial auctions with m types of goods.
The theorem is a consequence of the following lemmas.
Define the boolean function fh() to be true if σ(LP (v)) < (m + 1)vh(v), and false otherwise.
Lemma 13 (m + 1)-Apx-MUCA is monotone.
The proof of this lemma follows immediately from the following lemma:
Lemma 14 The condition Σnl=1xlvl < (m + 1)vh is aligned with the algorithm Largest.
Proof: For the first requirement of alignment, clearly if j ∈ Largest(v) then vj = vh(v). Hence
v′j = vh(v′) as v′j ≥ vj is the maximum among v′ = (v−j , v′j). Using the upper bound of lemma 8 and
the fact that fh(v) holds, we get: σ′ ≤ σ+Δ < (m+1)vh(v)+Δ ≤ (m+1)(vh(v)+Δ) = (m+1)vh(v′).
Thus fh(v′) holds.
For the second requirement, assume that fh(v′) holds and j /∈ Largest(v′). Clearly, vj 	= vh(v) =
vh(v′). By the lower bound of lemma 8: σ ≤ σ′ < (m+1)vh(v′) = (m+1)vh(v). Thus fh(v) holds.
Lemma 15 Algorithm (m+1)-Apx-MUCA provides an (m+1)-approximation for the Multi Unit
Combinatorial Auction allocation problem.
Proof: Let vo be the optimal value. Consider the cases:
• The allocation is by Largest. It follows that fh(v) holds, that is σ < (m + 1) vh. Hence:
vo ≤ σ < (m + 1) vh.
• The allocation is by LP-Based. Then σ ≥ (m + 1) vh. Any basic solution has at most m
strictly fractional components (see e.g. [8]). Recall that wLP−Based(v) is the value of all bids
j with xj = 1. Hence (m + 1)vh ≤ σ ≤ wLP−Based(v) +m · vh and so vh ≤ wLP−Based(v).
Now, vo ≤ σ ≤ wLP−Based(v) + m · vh ≤ (m + 1) wLP−Based(v).
7 Single Minded Bidders
Some of our techniques apply to the more general model of Single Minded Bidders of [18]. In this
section we shortly mention which techniques do generalize and how. A single minded bidder j
has a privately known (Sj , v∗j ), and it then submits to the mechanism a single bid of the form
(Tj , vj), where Tj ⊆ U . The definition of truthfulness of a mechanism, for single minded bidders,
is that bidding the truth (Tj , vj) = (Sj , v∗j ) is a dominant strategy for all bidders j. An allocation
algorithm A is monotone if for any bidder j and declarations of the other bidders (T−j , v−j),
whenever (Tj , vj) is a winning declaration for j so is any bid (T ′j , v
′
j) where T
′
j ⊆ Tj and v′j ≥ vj.
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Theorem 8 (essentially due to [18]) A normalized mechanism is truthful if and only if its allocation
algorithm is monotone and its payment scheme is based on critical value.
We mention whether and how each of our results generalizes.
• Characterization: The characterization of truthful mechanisms is now modified to include
algorithmic monotonicity in Tj .
• Basic algorithms: All 3 basic algorithms (Exst-k, LP-based, and Greedy) generalize.
Greedy is due to [18] and requires the ranking r to be also monotone in Tj .
• Operators: If-Then-Else is monotone. The proof goes through once the definition of align-
ment is modified to take into account the declared sets. MAX is not monotone in general, as
can be witnessed by example 2.
• Applications: The approximation mechanisms presented previously in subsections 6.1 and 6.2
are not necessarily truthful for single minded bidders. However, we provide an alternative
2-approximation mechanism for multi-unit auctions with single minded bidders. We can pro-
vide a direct proof of truthfulness for the following alternative 2-approximation mechanism
for multi-unit auctions.
Example 2 MAX is not monotone for single minded bidders. Applying MAX(Gv, Gd) on the bids:
B1 = ({a}, 6), B2 = ({b, c}, 5), B3 = ({c, d, e}, 7), B4 = ({a, b, c, d, e}, 12), where Bi = (Ti, vi). Then B1
loses. If player 1 increases his set and bids B′1 = ({a, b}, 6) he wins.
It is interesting to note that the above example suggests a possible way to modify the max
operator between two greedy algorithms to maintain monotonicity for single-minded-bidders. The
idea is to stop each greedy allocation in the first time that it fails to allocate a bid. In the above
example the modified Gd (greedy by density) will allocate only B′1, as opposed to B′1 and B3 by
the original Gd.
7.1 Basic Multi Unit Auction
In this subsection we describe a truthful 2-approximation mechanism for single minded bidders.
SMB-Apx-MU Algorithm
1. Re-index the bids so that: v1|T1| ≥ v2|T2| ≥ · · · ≥ vn|Tn|
2. Compute k to be the index such that
∑k−1
j=1 |Tj| ≤ M , and
∑k
j=1 |Tj | > M , where M is the
total number of identical items.
3. Compute σ =
∑k−1
j=1 vj . Compute vh = maxj∈N vj.
4. If vh ≥ σ return Largest, otherwise return K = {1, . . . , k − 1}
Theorem 9 The Mechanism with SMB-Apx-MU as the allocation algorithm and the associate
critical value payment scheme is a 2-approximation truthful mechanism for multi unit auctions.
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The proof of theorem is a consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 16 SMB-Apx-MU is monotone allocation algorithm.
Proof: Fix b−j = (T−j , v−j). Let bj = (Tj , vj) be a winning declaration. Consider b′j = (T ′j , v′j)
where vj ≤ v′j and |T ′j| ≤ |Tj |, that is the average value per item of b′j is higher than bj . We say
that b′j is denser that bj . Define b = (b−j , bj) and b′ = (b−j, b′j). Let Δ = v′j − vj . There are two
cases to consider.
• vh(b) < σ(b). In this case j ∈ K(b). Since b′j is denser than bj we conclude that j ∈ K(b′) as
well. Thus vh(b′) ≤ vh(b) +Δ < σ(b) +Δ ≤ σ(b′). Thus vh(b′) < σ(b′) and so b′j is a winning
declaration.
• vh(b) ≥ σ(b). Here vj = vh(b) and v′j = vh(b′). If j ∈ K(b′) then j is in both allocations and
the result follows. Otherwise, j /∈ K(b′). Since bj is less denser it follows that j /∈ K(b), and
so σ(b) = σ(b′). Hence vh(b′) = v′j = vh(b) + Δ ≥ σ(b) = σ(b′). Thus vh(b′) ≥ σ(b′) and so b′j
is a winning declaration.
Lemma 17 SMB-Apx-MU provides 2-approximation for the Multi Unit allocation problem.
The proof is similar to that in [19] and is omitted.
8 Acknowledgments
We thank Daniel Lehmann, Ron Lavi, Shahar Dobzinski, and Liad Blumrosen for helpful comments
and Gil Kalai for an early discussion.
References
[1] Aaron Archer, Christos Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, and Eva Tardos. An approximate
truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agent. In SODA, 2003.
[2] Aaron Archer and Eva Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 482–491, 2001.
[3] Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen. Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex
bundles. In RANDOM+APPROX, 2004.
[4] Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, and Elan Pavlov. Mechanism design for single-value domains, 2005.
AAAI-05.
[5] Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, and Elan Pavlov. Single value combinatorial auctions and imple-
mentation in undominated strategies, 2006. SODA’06.
[6] Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan. On the computational power of iterative auctions ii: As-
cending auctions. In EC, 2005.
[7] Patrick Briest, Piotr Krysta, and Berthold Voecking. Approximation techniques for utilitarian
mechanism design. In STOC, 2005.
18
[8] A. Caprara, H. Kellerer, U. Pferschy, and D. Pisinger. Approximation algorithms for knapsack
problems with cardinality constraints. European Journal of Operational Research, 123:333–345,
2000.
[9] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17–33, 1971.
[10] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combi-
natorial auctions with complement-free bidders. In STOC, 2005.
[11] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for
combinatorial auctions. In STOC, 2006.
[12] T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, pages 617–631, 1973.
[13] Magnu´s M. Halldo´rsson. Approximations of weighted independent set and hereditary subset
problems. J. Graph Algorithms Appl., 4:no. 1, 16 pp., 2000.
[14] Johan Hastad. Clique is hard to approximate to within n1−. Acta Mathematica, 182, 1999.
[15] Ron Holzman, Noa Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Bundling equilibrium
in combinatorial auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 47:104–123, 2004.
[16] Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’alem, and Noam Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combi-
natorial auctions, 2003. Working paper. Preliminary version presented in FOCS-03.
[17] Ron Lavi and Chaitanya Swamy. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear
programming. In FOCS, 2005.
[18] Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O’Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately
efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49(5):577–602, 2002.
[19] S. Martello and P. Toth. Knapsack Problems. Wiley, 1990.
[20] Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In STACS, 1999.
[21] Noam Nisan. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, 2000.
[22] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Computationally feasable vcg mechanisms. In EC, 2000.
[23] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior,
35:166–196, 2001.
[24] Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and
supporting lindahl prices. Working paper, 2002.
[25] Y. Shoham P. Cramton and R. Steinberg (eds.). Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, 2006.
[26] Christos H. Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games, and the internet. In STOC, 2001.
[27] Jeffrey S. Rosenschein and Gilad Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for
Automated Negotiation Among Computers. MIT Press, 1994.
19
[28] T. Sandholm, S. Suri, A. Gilpin, and Levine D. Cabob: A fast optimal algorithm for combi-
natorial auctions. In IJCAI, 2001.
[29] Tuomas Sandholm. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions.
In IJCAI-99, 1999.
[30] W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance,
pages 8–37, 1961.
[31] Rakesh Vohra and Sven de Vries. Combinatorial auctions: A survey, 2000. Available from
http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/vohra/htm/res.htm.
[32] Edo Zurel and Noam Nisan. An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial
auctions. In To appear in ACM conference on electronic commerce, 2001. Available from
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/˜noam/mkts.html.
20
